

VZCZCXYZ0000  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKT #1966/01 2021229  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 211229Z JUL 06  
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2466  
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4599  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4852  
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9969  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2841  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4249  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0021  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001966

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LEADERS TOUGHEN ATTITUDE ABOUT ARMS  
MANAGEMENT AND THE ROAD AHEAD

REF: KATHMANDU 1908

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nick Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY  
-----

11. (C) In separate meetings with CDA on July 19 and 20, Nepali Congress (NC) Vice President Sushil Koirala, Speaker of the House and CPN-UML Central Committee member Subash Nemwang, and Nepal Workers and Peasants' Party (NWPP) Chairman Narayan Man Bijukchhe expressed increasingly hardline positions on arms management and the future of the peace process. Each was firm in his resolve that Maoists cannot join the government until they completely disarm, a change from previous dialogue about gradual management of arms. The political leaders also discussed Seven-Party Alliance unity, the eight-point agreement as a roadmap, frustration with the Maoists, potential interim government composition, constituent assembly elections, and international involvement in the peace process. The atmosphere in each meeting was of both increased confidence and increased caution. End Summary.

TOUGHENING STANCE ON ARMS MANAGEMENT  
-----

12. (C) In separate meetings with CDA on July 19 and 20, NC Vice President Sushil Koirala, Speaker of the House Subash Nemwang, and NWPP Chairman Narayan Man Bijukchhe emphasized that disarmament was a non-negotiable prerequisite for Maoists joining the government. Speaker Nemwang said that Home Minister Krishna Sitaula had explicitly told Parliament that an interim government would form only after the Maoists disarmed. Nemwang further claimed that talk about dissolving Parliament was a distraction from the primary concern of arms. His focus on complete disarmament rather than vague "arms management" differed from our previous discussions with political leaders.

UNITED THEY STAND...MAYBE  
-----

13. (C) Nemwang and Bijukchhe strongly agreed with CDA that the political parties needed to stay united in order to keep the peace process moving forward. NC VP Koirala paid lip service to Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) unity, but he made it

clear that the larger parties were running the show. He said that unity was important, and the political parties had to be conscious of Maoist attempts to divide and conquer. However, he did not hide his conviction that the NC, CPN-UML, and NC-D should be the predominant members of any committee and the main decision-makers.

#### EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT A ROADMAP?

-----

¶4. (C) Speaker Nemwang stressed that the GON had a roadmap for the peace process in the form of the eight-point agreement, and that the current debate about the order of peace process progression was unnecessary. The Speaker resisted the idea that the eight-point agreement was ambiguous. He insisted that the only possible sequence the SPA/Maoist agreement prescribed was arms management, then constituent assembly elections, and then a new Parliament that would include Maoists. Despite obvious frustration with how the GON and SPA were handling negotiations, Nemwang was optimistic that the eight-point agreement would prevail. He cited accomplishments the GON had achieved through it, including the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee and the GON letter to the UN requesting monitoring assistance.

#### MAOISTS MANEUVERING

-----

¶5. (C) Each interlocutor expressed suspicion of Maoist intentions and frustration that the Maoists were not implementing the eight-point agreement. Rebuffing persistent rumors that the July 14 NC/CPM-UML/Maoist meeting had led to an agreement to induct Maoists into the House of Representatives (reftel), NC Vice President Koirala reminded

us that Prachanda himself had said the Maoists would have "no part in any Parliament the King had approved." Koirala then said that the Maoists contend that they should have the most authority because they saw themselves as the ones who had reinstated Parliament and protected the political parties from the King.

¶6. (C) Speaker Nemwang derided the Maoists for being two-faced, promising to abide by the eight-point agreement while promoting defiance of it in district speeches and internal meetings. NWPP Chairman Bijukchhe distanced his communist party from the Maoists, whom he called anarchists. He complained that the Maoists wanted to capture state power but did not care about improving life for all people. Bijukchhe lamented that the political parties were unable to convince the Maoists to play fairly. He commented that in addition to disarmament, the Maoists had to respect human rights and return stolen property before they could enter the political mainstream. Bijukchhe advocated the integration of the Maoist and Nepal Armies into a new, single force, but he underscored the necessity of first "reprogramming" Maoist cadres to fit into a democratic society.

#### REPRESENTATION IN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

-----

¶7. (C) NC VP Koirala ridiculed the Maoist proposal that an interim government should be one-third each Maoists, SPA, and civil society. He said the Maoists were banking on civil society support for a de facto Maoist majority. Bijukchhe offered his party's vision of parliamentary representation: 17 percent each NC, CPN-UML, and Nepali Congress-Democratic; 5 percent for each of the four smaller parties in the SPA; 25 percent Maoists; and 4 percent civil society. Bijukchhe clarified that the constituent assembly should have this breakdown, and the assembly should form an interim government with a similar distribution of portfolios. None of our interlocutors could offer a scenario likely to be accepted by all sides.

#### WILLING TO WAIT FOR ELECTIONS

-----

¶8. (C) None of the three interlocutors was convinced that constituent assembly elections would occur by April 2007, the target date identified by the GON. Koirala said elections could happen within a year if the peace process advanced smoothly. Nemwang assured us that elections would occur according to the eight-point agreement--and that he would play an active role as Speaker of the House--but he did not speculate on a timeframe. Bijukchhe explained that the Nepali people wanted peace first, then democracy, and were not wed to a specific date.

#### INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WANTED ON GON TERMS

-----

¶9. (C) Both Koirala and Nemwang urged that the UN begin monitoring of arms as soon as possible. They appeared pleased with the news that a UN assessment team would arrive on July 26, but maintained that the GON would have to set clear guidelines before operations could proceed. Koirala told us that the political parties had not yet delineated the terms of UN involvement, but were sure that a UN presence would be the only motivator for Maoists to comply with arms management. Nemwang stated that the parliamentary committee had decided on July 19 that the GON and Maoists must first work out a peace accord, human rights agreement, and cease-fire agreement before they could set the conditions for a UN role. Both leaders requested continued USG support.

¶10. (C) The NWPP Chairman had a different outlook on international involvement. He asserted that Nepal should try to solve its own problems. Bijukchhe acknowledged that Nepal would benefit from US and UN experience, but was adamant that outsiders should not help without a specific request from the GON.

#### COMMENT

-----

¶11. (C) Party leaders' focus on complete disarmament of the Maoists represents their hardening resolve and greater confidence. Political leaders are painfully aware of the unreciprocated concessions granted to the Maoists in the eight-point agreement. Party leaders seem to be making a conscious decision to slow down, untangle themselves from the momentum of the April pro-democracy movement, and consider the ramifications of agreements they make with the Maoists. PM Koirala's continued ill health, however, has left the fractious SPA without a decision-maker, enforcer, or rudder. Koirala's ability to play an active role in leading the SPA will be a decisive factor in the days ahead.

DEAN